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Abstract. In [SR98] it has been shown that λ-calculus with control can be interpreted in
any domain D which is isomorphic to the domain of functions from Dω to the 2-element
(Sierpin´ski) lattice Σ. By a theorem of A. Pitts there exists a unique subset P of D such
that f ∈ P iff f(~d) = ⊥ for all ~d ∈ Pω. The domain D gives rise to a realizability structure
in the sense of [Kri11] where the set of proof-like terms is given by P .
When working in Scott domains the ensuing realizability model coincides with the ground
model Set but when taking D within coherence spaces we obtain a classical realizability
model of set theory different from any forcing model. We will show that this model validates
countable and dependent choice since an appropriate form of bar recursion is available in
stable domains.
Dedicated to Pierre-Louis Curien at the occasion of his 60th Birthday
Introduction
In the first decade of this millenium J.-L. Krivine has developed his theory of classical
realizability, see e.g. [Kri09, Kri11], for higher order logic and set theory. Whereas intu-
itionistic realizability is based on the notion of a partial combinatory algebra (pca) classical
realizability is based on a notion of realizability algebra as defined in [Kri11]. Both notions
are incomparable since not every pca can be extended to a realizability algebra and there
are realizability algebras which do not contain a pca as a substructure. Accordingly, not all
classical realizability models appear as booleanizations of intuitionistic realizability models
as studied in [vO08].
In the current paper, however, we concentrate on a particular classical realizability
model which appears as a boolean subtopos of a relative realizability topos (see [vO08]).
The starting point for this model is the observation from [SR98] that the recursive domain
D ∼= ΣDω gives rise to a model for λ-calculus with control. (Here Σ = {⊥,>} is the 2-element
Sierpin´ski lattice and Dω is the countable product of D.) Since D is a model of untyped
λ-calculus it is in particular a pca. By a theorem of A. Pitts [Pit96] there exists a unique
subset P of D such that t ∈ P iff t(~s) = ⊥ for all ~s ∈ Pω. Obviously, this subset P forms a
sub-pca of D thus giving rise to the relative realizability topos E = RT(D,P ) as described
in [vO08]. Notice that >D ∈ D \P and thus U = {>D} gives rise to a nontrivial truth value
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in E different from both >E and ⊥E . This U (like any subterminal object of E) induces a
closure operator (aka Lawvere-Tierney topology) jU (p) = (p → U) → U on E . As is well
known the subtopos EU of jU -sheaves of E is boolean.
We will show that EU is equivalent to the classical realizability topos K induced by the
realizability structure whose set Λ of terms is D, whose set of stacks Π is Dω and whose set
PL of proof-like terms is P . We will show that K is equivalent to Set when D is the bifree
solution of the domain equation D ∼= ΣDω in Scott domains. However, when considering
the solution of D ∼= ΣDω in the category Coh of coherence spaces and Scott continuous
and stable maps then the ensuing boolean topos K is not a Grothendieck topos and thus a
fortiori not a forcing model1. We will show that K validates all true sentences of first order
arithmetic and the principles of countable and dependent choice.
1. Realizability structures induced by D ∼= ΣDω
Quite generally we might consider objects D ∼= ΣDω in well pointed cartesian closed
categories C with countable products and an object Σ having precisely two global elements
(i.e. morphisms 1→ Σ) > and ⊥. The set of global elements of D (which we also denote
by D) can be endowed with the structure of a pca as follows: for t, s ∈ D we define ts ∈ D
as (ts)(~r) = t(s.~r). For the set Λ of terms we take D and for the set Π of stacks we take
Dω. The push operation sends t ∈ Λ and ~s ∈ Π to t.~s, the stream with head t and tail ~s.
For every ~s ∈ Π let k~s ∈ Λ be defined as k~s(t.~r) = t(~s). The control operator cc is given by
cc(t.~s) = t(k~s.~s). A natural choice for the pole ‚ is {〈t, ~s〉 | t(~s) = >}.
But on this level of generality we do not know how to choose a set PL of “proof-like
terms”. However, in case D is the bifree solution of D ∼= ΣDω in some category of domains
like
1) cpo’s with bottom and Scott continuous functions
2) coherence spaces and stable (continuous) maps
3) observably sequential algorithms as in [CCF94]
by a theorem of A. Pitts (see [Pit96]) there exists a unique subset P of D such that t ∈ P iff
t(~s) = ⊥ for all ~s ∈ Pω. Such a P qualifies as a set PL of proof-like terms since P is closed
under application, contains all elements definable in untyped λ-calculus and we also have
cc ∈ P .
For later use we remark that the identity map on D is represented by i ∈ P with
i(t.~s) = t(~s).
2. Some triposes induced by (D,P )
Since P is a subpca of the pcaD we may consider the relative realizability topos E = RT(D,P )
induced by the tripos P over Set where for a set I the fibre PI is the preorder
(P(D)I ,`I)
with φ `I ψ iff ∃t ∈ P.∀i ∈ I.∀s ∈ φi. ts ∈ ψi and for u : J → I reindexing along u is given
by precomposition with u. For the set ΣP of propositions of P we may take P(D) and for
the truth predicate on ΣP we may take idP(D).
Notice that ΣP contains an “intermediate” truth value U = {>D} which is neither
equivalent to ⊥ΣP = ∅ nor to >ΣP = D. Moreover, in RT(D,P ) the proposition U = {>D}
1i.e. a category of sheaves over a complete boolean algebra or, equivalently, a Grothendieck topos where
every epimorphism splits, see e.g. [Joh02]
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is equivalent to U ∨ ¬U (since ¬U = ∅) but not to D. Thus U ∨ ¬U does not hold in
RT(D,P ) for which reason the topos RT(D,P ) is not boolean. However, the truth value
U gives rise to the (Lawvere-Tierney) topology jU on ΣP = P(D) which is defined as
jU (A) = (A → U) → U for A ∈ P(D). We may form the full subtripos PU of P
consisting of jU -closed predicates, i.e. φ ∈ P(D)I with jU ◦ φ `I φ. Since jU = ¬U ◦ ¬U with
¬UA = A→ U the fibres of PU are all boolean. We write EU = RT(D,P )U for the ensuing
boolean subtopos of E = RT(D,P ).
As described in the previous section P ⊆ D gives rise to a classical realizability structure
with pole ‚ = {〈t, ~s〉 | t(~s) = >}. We write E‚ = RT(D,P )‚ or rather simply K for the
ensuing classical realizability topos which is induced by the full subtriposPK ofP consisting
of those predicates φ ∈ P(D)I which factor through ΣK = {A ∈ P(D) | A‚‚ = A}. We
show now that
Lemma 2.1. PK is equivalent to PU .
Proof. First recall that on P(D) implication is given by A → B = {t ∈ D | ∀s ∈ A. ts ∈
B} = {t ∈ D | ∀s ∈ A. λ~r.t(s.~r) ∈ B} from which it follows that ΣK is an exponential ideal
in P(D), i.e. A→ B is in ΣK whenever B is in ΣK. Since U ∈ ΣK the map jU sends P(D)
to ΣK. Thus, postcomposition with jU gives rise to a tripos morphism from P to PK left
adjoint to the inclusion of tripos PK into the tripos P (as induced by ΣK ⊆ P(D)). Since
A → jU (A) is uniformly realized by η = λx.λp.px ∈ P and for A ∈ ΣK the implication
jU (A) → A is uniformly realized by cc ∈ P the adjunction above between P and PU
restricts to an equivalence between PU and PK.2
Thus K = RT(D,P )‚ and RT(D,P )U are equivalent boolean subtoposes of the relative
realizability topos E = RT(D,P ) which itself is not boolean. We write i : K ↪→ E for the
corresponding injective geometric morphism. Its inverse image part i∗ : E → K (sheafification)
is given by postcomposition with jU . Its (right adjoint) direct image part i∗ : K → E is
nontrivial. As described in [vO08] it sends an object X in K to S(X), the object of singleton
predicates on X in K considered as an object of E .
Notice, however, that interpretation in EU is not the same as (a kind of) negative
translation (with U for falsity) followed by interpretation in E since this leaves interpretations
of terms unchanged. But the finite type hierarchies over natural numbers are quite different
in E and in EU from type level 2 onwards because of the presence of discontinuous functionals
in EU as opposed to E where all functionals over natural numbs are continuous.
For convenience and later use we explicitate a bit the logical structure of the triposes
introduced above.
For A,B ∈ P(D) implication in P is given by A → B = {t ∈ D | ∀s ∈ A. ts ∈ B}.
Since the local operator jU commutes with this implication it also works for PU . Looking a
bit closer one sees that this holds also for PK since if A and B are biorthogonally closed
then A→ B = {t ∈ D | ∀s ∈ A.∀~r ∈ B‚.t(s.~r) = >} = {s.~r | s ∈ A,~r ∈ B‚}‚ and thus is
biorthogonally closed, too.
For a set I universal quantification ∀I along the terminal projection I → 1 is given by
intersection, i.e. ∀I(φ) =
⋂
i∈I
φi. Since ∀I(φ → U) =
(⋃
i∈I
φi
) → U it is immediate that ∀I
restricts to PU . This applies also to PK since ∀I(φ) =
⋂
i∈I
φi =
⋂
i∈I
φ‚‚i =
(⋃
i∈I
φ‚i
)‚
for
2Question We know that jU (A) → A‚‚ is realized by cc uniformly in A ∈ P(D). But is the reverse
implication also realizable uniformly in A?
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which reason ∀I(φ) is biorthogonally closed. Universal quantification along arbitrary maps
u : J → I in Set is given by
∀u(φ)i = ∀J(λj∈J.leq(u(j), i)→ φj)
where leq stands for Leibniz equality.
Recall that Leibniz equality on set I is defined as
leqI(i, j) =
⋂
p∈ΣI
p(i)→ p(j)
where Σ refers to the Σ of the respective tripos. For the tripos P Leibniz equality on a set I
is given by leqI(i, j) = {i | i = j}. Obviously, the predicate leqI is equivalent to the predicate
eqI defined as eqI(i, j) = {d ∈ D | i = j}. This observation is useful for obtaining a simple
description of equality predicates for the tripos PU since they are of the form jU ◦ eqI .
Notice that jU (∅) = (∅ → U)→ U = D → U = U = {>D} and jU (D) = (D → U)→ U =
U → U = {d ∈ D | d>D = >D} = {d ∈ D | ∀~s ∈ Dω. d(>D.~s) = >} = {>D} ∪ ↑0¯ where
0¯ is the least element of D sending >D.⊥∞D to >. Thus, for PU equality on I is given by
eqI(i, j) = {>D} ∪ ↑{0¯ | i = j}. A different but equivalent implementation of equality on I
for PU is given by eqI(i, j) = {>D}∪{i | i = j} since there is a least r ∈ P with r⊥D = ⊥D,
r>D = >D and rd = i for d w 0¯.
Since PK is equivalent to its subtripos PU the above considerations apply to PK as
well.
3. Nothing new in case of Scott domains
In a talk in Chambery in June 2012 [Kri12] Krivine has shown that a classical realizability
model is a forcing model iff it validates the sentence3 ∀xג2(x 6= 0, x 6= 1→ ⊥), i.e. iff there
exists a proof-like term realizing |>,⊥ → ⊥| ∩ |⊥,> → ⊥|. He has shown that from such a
realizer one can construct a proof-like term Φ such that Φ ∈ |A| whenever |A| contains some
proof-like term.
This applies in particular to the realizability structures as described in section 1 where
|>| = D and |⊥| = {>D}. Obviously, in this case t ∈ P realizes |>,⊥ → ⊥| ∩ |⊥,> → ⊥| iff
t>Ds = >D = ts>D for all s ∈ D. But since t ∈ P entails t⊥D⊥D 6= >D this would give
rise to a morphism ∨ : Σ × Σ → Σ with u ∨ v = ⊥ iff u = v = ⊥ which does not exist in
stable domain theory. However, in Scott domains such a morphism does exist (“parallel or”)
and allows one to construct an element of P realizing |>,⊥ → ⊥| ∩ |⊥,> → ⊥|. Moreover,
in the case of Scott domains the classical realizability model induced by D and P is not only
a forcing model but it is actually equivalent to the “ground model” Set as we show next.
Since P is Scott closed and closed under binary suprema it contains a greatest element
Φ =
⊔
P . Obviously, we have Φ(~s) = ⊥ iff ~s ∈ Pω. Thus, a proposition A holds in the
ensuing realizability model (i.e. |A| ∩P 6= ∅) iff Φ ∈ |A| (since |A| = ||A||‚ is upward closed).
Now for propositions A and B we have
Φ ∈ |A→ B| iff
∀t ∈ |A|∀~s ∈ ||B|| Φ(t.~s) = > iff
∀t ∈ |A|∀~s ∈ ||B|| t 6∈ P ∨ ~s 6∈ Pω iff
∀t ∈ |A|∀~s ∈ ||B|| t ∈ P ⇒ ~s 6∈ Pω iff
∀t ∈ |A| (t ∈ P ⇒ ∀~s ∈ ||B|| ~s 6∈ Pω) iff
3in our terminology this means that ∀x:2.(eq2(x, 0) ∨ eq2(x, 1)) holds in the tripos PK
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∀t ∈ |A| (t ∈ P ⇒ Φ ∈ |B|) iff(∃t ∈ P t ∈ |A|)⇒ Φ ∈ |B| iff
Φ ∈ |A| ⇒ Φ ∈ |B|
i.e. A → B holds iff from validity of A follows validity of B. Thus the ensuing classical
realizability model is a 2-valued forcing model, i.e. coincides with the ground model Set.
The situation changes dramatically if one solves the domain equation for D in a category
not admitting ∨ : Σ× Σ→ Σ as e.g. the category Coh of coherence spaces and stable maps
(see [GLT89]), the category OSA of observably sequential algorithms (see [CCF94]) or a
category of HON games and innocent algorithms. Let us look more closely at the example
of D = ΣD
ω
in Coh in which ||⊥|| = Dω and ||>|| = ∅ and accordingly |⊥| = {>D} and
|>| = D. Now if f ∈ |>,⊥ → ⊥| ∩ |⊥,> → ⊥| then f>D⊥D = >D = f⊥D>D and thus,
by stability of f , also f⊥D⊥D = >D from which it follows that f 6∈ P . Thus the ensuing
classical realizability model cannot be a forcing model (sheaves over a complete Boolean
algebra) and, accordingly, is in particular different from the ground model Set.
4. Bifree Solution of D = ΣD
ω
in Coh
Let V be the least set with V = Pfin(ω×V ). If α ∈ V and n ∈ ω we write αn for the set
{β ∈ V | 〈n, β〉 ∈ α}. By recursion on n ∈ ω we will define a sequence of coherence spaces
Dn =
(|Dn|,¨n) with |Dn| ⊆ V such that
(1) |Dn| ⊆ |Dn+1|
(2) for α, β ∈ |Dn| we have α ¨n β iff α ¨n+1 β
(3) α ˚n β iff α ∪ β ∈ Dn
(4) α ¨n β iff α ∪ β ∈ Dn implies α = β.
For getting the construction of the Dn right it is usful to recall that coherence spaces and
linear continuous maps between them give rise4 to a model of linear logic and that ΣD
ω
=
!(Dω)(⊥ = (!(Dω))⊥. We put |D0| = ∅, i.e. D0 is the terminal object in Coh. Notice that
(3) and (4) vacuously hold for D0. For the induction step we put Dn+1 = Σ
Dωn =
(
!(Dωn)
)⊥
as suggested by ΣD
ω
= !(Dω)(⊥. Thus, the web |Dn+1| of Dn+1 consists of all α ∈ V such
that for all k ∈ ω it holds that αk ∈ Dn, i.e. β ¨n γ for all β, γ ∈ αk, since |Dn+1| is the web
of !(Dωn) and for this coherence space we have α ¨ β iff α ∪ β ∈ |Dn+1|. Thus, for defining
its orthogonal Dn+1 we put α ¨n+1 β iff α ∪ β ∈ |Dn+1| implies α = β. Conditions (3) and
(4) hold for Dn+1 by construction since they hold for Dn by induction hypothesis. We write
D for the coherence space where |D| = ⋃
n∈ω
|Dn| and ¨ is the union of the ¨n.
Actually, one can avoid any explicit reference to the levels Dn and inductively define |D|
as the least subset of V with α ∈ |D| whenever ∀n∈ω. αn ⊆ |D| ∧ ∀β, γ ∈ αn. β ¨ γ where
β ¨ γ stands for β ∪ γ ∈ |D| ⇒ β = γ. Notice that |D| is closed under subsets and we have
α ˚ β iff α ∪ β ∈ |D|.
Now we describe the realizability structure arising from D. The elements of ΛD = D
are those t ∈ P(|D|) such that ∀α, β ∈ t. α ¨ β, i.e. antichains in the poset (|D|,⊆). The
evaluation map D ×Dω → Σ is defined as follows: for t ∈ D and ~s ∈ Dω we have t(~s) = >
(notation t ? ~s ∈‚) iff ∃α ∈ t.∀n ∈ ω. αn ⊆ sn. With an ~s ∈ Dω one may associate the
4Actually, this model was the source of linear logic! But classical realizability does not make any use of
the fact that D lives within the Kleisli category of the “archetypical” coherence space model for linear logic.
Actually, we rather think of classical realizability as a non-linear version of Girard’s Ludics.
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set I~s = {α ∈ |D| | {α}(~s) = >} = {α ∈ |D| | ∀n ∈ ω. αn ⊆ sn}. Sets of this form can be
characterized as downward closed ideals in |D|, i.e. subsets of D which are closed under
subsets and finite unions. Any such ideal I is equal to I~s for a unique ~s ∈ Dω which is given
by sn =
⋃
α∈I
αn. Writing ΠD for the set of downward closed ideals in (|D|,⊆) for t ∈ ΛD
and pi ∈ ΠD we have t ? pi ∈‚ iff t ∩ pi 6= ∅.
For exhibiting in a concrete way the remaining operations of the realizability structure
induced by D = ΣD
ω
we have to introduce some notation. For a finite a ∈ D and α ∈ |D|
we write a.α for ({0}×a)∪{〈n+ 1, β〉 | 〈n, β〉 ∈ α}. For t ∈ ΛD and pi ∈ ΠD let t.pi = {a.α |
a ⊆fin t, α ∈ pi}. For t, s ∈ ΛD let ts = {α ∈ |D| | ∃a ⊆fin s. a.α ∈ t}. For f ∈ Coh(D,D) let
fun(f) = {a.α | (a, α) ∈ tr(f)} where tr(f) is the trace of f , i.e. the set of all pairs (a, α) s.t.
a ∈ D is finite and α ∈ f(a) and for all b ⊆ a from α ∈ f(b) it follows that a = b. Using fun
we define λx.t = fun(a 7→ t[a/x]). For pi ∈ ΠD we put kpi = {α̂ | α ∈ pi} where α̂ = {〈0, α〉}
for α ∈ |D|. We define cc = {{{α̂1, . . . , α̂k}.α}.(α∪α1∪ . . .∪αk) | α∪α1∪ . . .∪αk ∈ |D|}.
Finally, we have to define which elements of ΛD we want to consider as proof-like objects.
By recursion on α ∈ |D| we define |α| ∈ {0, 1} as |α| = 1 iff ∃n ∈ ω.∃β ∈ αn. |β| = 0. Thus
|α| = 1 iff α does not raise any error itself. Accordingly, we define the subset P of proof-like
objects of D as {a ∈ D | ∀α ∈ a. |α| = 1}.
4.1. Some useful retractions in P . Let hn be the sequence of subidentical retractions of
D where h0 = λf :D.⊥D and hn+1 = Σhωn . Notice, that all hn are elements of P since idD
is in P and hn v idD. Obviously, we have idD =
⊔
n∈ω
hn but the images of the hn typically
contain elements which are not finite. Notice that the image of hn is Dn for all n ∈ ω.
There is also a subidentical retraction rP ∈ P sending a ∈ D to rP (a) = {α ∈ a | |α| = 1}.
Obviously, the image of rP is precisely P and rP (a) is the greatest element of P below a.
4.2. D is universal for countably based coherence spaces. To give an impression
of the complexity of D we show that it contains every countably based coherence space
via a stably continuous embedding/projection pair (see e.g. [AL91]). First recall that in
Th. 2.4.2.9 of [AL91]) it has been shown that every coherence space X with countable web
can be embedded into !Tω via a stably continuous embedding/projection pair (where T is
the coherence space whose web consists of two incoherent tokens thought of as boolean
values). Thus, the coherence space X⊥ can be embedded into (!Tω)⊥ = ΣTω . Accordingly, all
coherence spaces with countable web can be embedded into ΣT
ω
. Since T can be embedded
into D the coherence space ΣT
ω
can be embedded into ΣD
ω
and thus into D.
4.3. Antichains in Coherence Spaces. Let X be a coherence space. An antichain in X
is a subset A of X such that a, b ∈ A are equal whenever they are coherent (i.e. a ∪ b ∈ X).
We may order antichains in X “a` la Smyth” as follows
A ≤S B iff ∀y ∈ B.∃x ∈ A. x v y
i.e. A ≤S B iff ↑A ⊇ ↑B. This suggest to consider antichains as upward closed subsets C of
X such that for the set min(C) of minimal elements of C it holds that
(1) C ⊆ ↑min(C) and
(2) coherent elements of min(C) are equal.
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Under this view antichains may be considered as disjoint unions of cones, i.e. sets of the
form ↑x for some x ∈ X. We write A (X) for the set of antichains considered as upward
closed subsets of X satisfying conditions (1) and (2) and consider it partially ordered by
reverse subset inclusion. One can show that
Theorem 4.1. A (X) is a complete lattice when ordered by ⊇.
Proof. Let (Ci)i∈I be a family of antichains in X. We show that its intersection D :=
⋂
i∈I
Ci
is again an antichain from which it is immediate that D is the supremum of the Ci w.r.t ⊇.
Obviously, the set D is upwards closed. For x ∈ D and i ∈ I let xi be the unique element
of min(Ci) with xi v x. Since (xi)i∈I is bounded by x its supremum m(x) exists. It is easy
to see that x w m(x) ∈ min(D). Thus D validates condition (1). For showing condition (2)
suppose x, y ∈ min(D) have an upper bound. Then for all i ∈ I we have xi ¨ yi and thus
xi = yi from which it follows that m(x) = m(y) and thus x = y as desired.
An important class of antichains in X are those of the form p−1(>) for some p ∈ ΣX .
Via trace they correspond to those U ∈ A (X) for which all elements of min(U) are compact
elements of X. We write A0(X) for this class of antichains in X. For every C ⊆ X we may
consider the antichain
C =
⋂
{U ∈ A0(X) | U ⊇ C}
which, obviously, contains C as a subset. It is easy to see that C 7→ C is a closure operator
on P(X) since C is the intersection of all stably open subsets of X which contain C as a
subset.5
For X = Dω and C ⊆ X we have C‚ = {t ∈ ΣX | C ⊆ t−1(>)} and thus C = C‚‚.
Notice that the minimal elements of C‚ w.r.t. the stable order are those t ∈ D = ΣDω for
which every element of tr(t) is below some element of C. For t ∈ C‚ the unique minimal
element m(t) in C‚ below t is characterized as follows: e ∈ tr(m(t)) iff e ∈ tr(t) and e v x
for some x ∈ C.
Since the infimum operation u : Σ× Σ→ Σ is stably continuous for t1, t2 ∈ D we have
t1 u t2 ∈ D. Obviously, we have (t1 u t2)−1(>) = t−11 (>) ∩ t−12 (>). Thus C‚ is not only
an antichain in D but it is also closed under u and contains λx:X.> as an element. It is
an interesting but difficult problem to characterize those antichains A in D which are of
the form C‚ for some C ⊆ X. Well, it are those A ⊆ D for which A = A‚‚. But is
there a more elementary combinatorial characterization of biorthogonally closed subsets of
D? Such a characterization might be helpful for answering the question whether for any
biorthogonally closed subset A of D either A or its negation ¬UA is inhabited by an element
of P , i.e. whether K is 2-valued.
5. Exploring the structure of E and K
We have seen that K is equivalent to Set when constructed from the bifree solution of
D = ΣD
ω
in Scott domains. But something new arises when we start from the solution of
this domain equation in Coh. We start now exploring this new territory. Some attention
will also be payed to the inituitionistic variant E in which computation is much easier than
in its full subcategory K of jU -sheaves.
5If X is a Scott domain then intersections of open subsets of X are just upward closed subsets of X. Alas,
such an easy characterizations is not available for intersections of stably open subsets of a coherence space X.
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For every n ∈ N let n¯ be the unique element of D with n¯(~s) = > iff sn = >D. A
“hardwired” version of this is n¯ = {νn} with νn = {〈n, ∅〉} ∈ |D|. From this it is obvious that
the n¯ are atoms of D and pairwise incoherent, i.e. νn ˇ νm iff n 6= m. Obviously, we have
n¯ ∈ P since |νn| = 1.
In E = RT(D,P ) a natural numbers object is given by the assembly NE with underlying
set N and ||n||NE = {n¯}. Similarly, the object 2E in E is given by the assembly with
underlying set 2 = {0, 1} and ||k||2E = {k¯}. The object ∆E(2) of E is given by the assembly
with underlying set 2 and ||k||∆E(2) = D.
The corresponding objects NK, 2K and ∆K(2) in K are obtained from NE , 2E and ∆E(2)
in E by sheafification (denoted as i∗), i.e. by postcomposing the respective equality predicates
with jU . But since jU is a bit complex we are looking for somewhat simpler isomorphic
copies of these objects in K.
Since jU (∅) = {>D} and jU (D) = {>D} ∪ ↑{0¯} for every set I the object ∆K(I) of K
has underlying set I and equality predicate [[i ∼∆K(I) j]] = {>D} ∪ ↑{0¯ | i = j}.
Next we determine i∗NE , the natural numbers object of K obtained by sheafifying the
natural numbers object NE of E . The underlying set of i∗NE is N and its equality predicate
is given by [[n ∼i∗NE m]] = jU
(
[[n ∼NE m]]
)
. The following lemma exhibits an object NK
which in K is isomorphic to i∗NE but simpler to describe and simpler to manipulate.
Lemma 5.1. Let NK be the object of K with underlying set N and equality predicate
[[n ∼NK m]] = {>D} ∪ ↑{n¯ | n = m}. In K the object NK is isomorphic to i∗NE and thus a
natural numbers object in K
Proof. For showing the desired isomorphism it suffices to exhibit elements of P realizing the
logical equivalence of [[n ∼NK m]] and jU
(
[[n ∼NE m]]
)
uniformly in n and m.
First notice that [[n ∼NK n]] = {>D} ∪ ↑n¯ = {~s ∈ Dω | sn = >D}‚ ∈ ΣK. Next we
determine jU ({n¯}) = ({n¯} → U)→ U for n ∈ N. Observe that {n¯} → U = {d ∈ D | dn¯ =
>D} = {d ∈ D | ∀~s ∈ Dω. d(n¯.~s) = >}. Thus, we have jU ({n¯}) = {d ∈ D | ∀d′ ∈ D. d′n¯ =
>D ⇒ dd′ = >D}.
First we show that cc ∈ P realizes the implication jU
(
[[n ∼NE m]]
) → [[n ∼NK m]]
uniformly in n and m. If n 6= m then [[n ∼NK m]] = {>D} = jU (∅) = jU
(
[[n ∼NE m]]
)
and
the claim follows since cc>D = >D. Thus it suffice to show that cc realizes jU
(
[[n ∼NE
n]]
)→ [[n ∼NK n]] for all n. For this purpose suppose t ∈ jU ({n¯}) and ~s ∈ Dω with sn = >D.
Then k(~s) ∈ {n¯} → U since for ~r ∈ Dω we have k(~s)(n¯.~r) = n¯(~s) = >. Thus, we have
cc(t.~s) = t(k(~s).~s) = > as desired since t ∈ jU ({n¯}) and k(~s) ∈ {n¯} → U .
There is an e ∈ P with e>D = >D and en¯d = dn¯ for all n ∈ N and d ∈ D. Obviously,
such an e realizes {>D} → jU (∅). Moreover, for n ∈ N we have en¯ ∈ jU ({n¯}) since if
dn¯ = >D then also en¯d = dn¯ = >D. Thus, since jU ({n¯}) is upward closed for every d w n¯
we have en¯ v ed ∈ jU ({n¯}). Thus e realizes {>D} ∪ ↑n¯→ jU ({n¯}). Thus, we have shown
that e realizes [[n ∼NK m]]→ jU
(
[[n ∼NE m]]
)
uniformly in n and m.
Similarly, one shows that in K the object i∗2E is isomorphic to the object 2K with
underlying set 2 = {0, 1} and equality predicate [[i ∼2K j]] = {>D} ∪ ↑{i | i = j}. Since K
is a boolean topos the truth value object ΩK is known to be isomorphic to 2K. We do not
know whether the object 2K has precisely two global elements, i.e. whether the topos K is
2-valued.6
6But it can be shown that for countable A ⊆ D either A‚‚ or its negation are true in K.
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Since K is a subtopos of E arising from the Lawvere-Tierney topology jU on E there is
an induced injective geometric morphism i : K ↪→ E whose inverse image part i∗ : E → K
we have already described. It is fairly simple since it is given by postcomposition with jU .
However, its right adjoint i∗, the direct image part of i, though full and faithful is not simply
inclusion in the naive sense. As described e.g. in [vO08] it sends an object X of K to the
object i∗X of E which is the object S(X) of ‘singleton predicates’ on X in K considered as
an object of E . The underlying set of S(X) is the set of all functions from |X| to ΣK where
|X| is the underlying set of X. The existence predicate ES(X) on Σ|X|K is given by
ES(X)(A) = [[PredX(A) ∧ ∃x:|X|.∀y:|X|.A(y)↔ x ∼X y]]
where
PredX(A) = [[∀x:|X|.A(x)→ x ∼X x ∧ (∀y:|X|.x ∼X y → A(y))]]
and the equality predicate for S(X) is given by
[[A ∼S(X) B]] = [[ES(X)(A) ∧ ∀x:|X|.A(x)↔ B(x)]]
which finishes the description of S(X). For the morphism part of S suppose F : |X| × |Y | →
ΣK represents a morphism from X to Y . Then the corresponding morphisms from S(X) to
S(Y ) is given by the ΣK-valued predicate S(F ) : Σ
|X|
K × Σ|Y |K → ΣK defined as
S(F )(A,B) = [[ES(X)(A) ∧ ES(Y )(B) ∧ ∀x:|X|, y:|Y |.F (x, y)↔ (A(x) ∧B(y))]]
for A ∈ Σ|X|K and B ∈ Σ|Y |K . Thus, though the inclusion of K into E via i∗ preserves
exponentials due to the complicated nature of i∗ there is not much gain when computing
the exponentials in the relative realizability topos E .
Generally, since classical realizability toposes are boolean Ω is isomorphic to 2. Thus,
since 2 is a subobject of N the exponential NN contains 2N ∼= P(N) as a subobject which
explains why in general NN is so complicated in classical realizability toposes. Maybe this
is the reason why Krivine in his papers considers classical realizability models for classical
second order logic or the classical set theory ZF which are both based on sets and not on
functions. In both settings functions appear only as a derived concept, namely as functional
relations, i.e. particular sets.7
So far we do not know yet whether K is actually different from a forcing model. But it
will follow from the results of the following subsection where we show that
K is not even a Grothendieck topos. Since there is no parallel-or in the realizability
structure induced by P ⊆ D it follows from Krivine’s observation in [Kri12] that the object
∆K(2) is not isomorphic to 2K. For this reason the tripos PK does not arise from a complete
boolean algebra. But from this it does not follow yet that K is not equivalent to a forcing
model, i.e. a localic boolean topos, since non-equivalent triposes might induce the same
topos. But we will show now that K is not even a Grothendieck topos and thus a fortiori
not a forcing model.
For this purpose we will proceed in two steps. First in Lemma 5.3 we will show that
every Grothendieck subtopos of K is equivalent to Set and then in the subsequent Lemma 5.4
we will show that K is not equivalent to Set. It is then an immediate consequence of these
two lemmas that
7Of course, in case of second order logic he has to permit function constants on the underlying (countable)
set of objects (usually identified with the set natural numbers).
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Theorem 5.2. K is not a Grothendieck topos and thus, in particular, not a forcing model.
The following considerations are necessary as preparation for the proofs of Lemma 5.3
and 5.4.
There is a geometric inclusion ΠE a ∆E : Set ↪→ E where ΠE is given by E(U,−). The
right adjoint ∆E sends set I to the object ∆E(I) = (I, eqI) (see section 2) and u : J → I in
Set to the morphism ∆E(u) : ∆E(J)→ ∆E(I) represented by theP-predicate eqI(u(j), i) on
J × I. Notice that ∆E factors through Asm(P,D), the category of assemblies in RT(D,P ),
since ∆E(I) is isomorphic to the assembly with underlying set I and ||i|| = D for all i ∈ I.
The restriction of the left adjoint ΠE to Asm(P,D) sends an assembly to its underlying set
and a morphism to its underlying set-theoretic function. Notice that ΠE a ∆E : Set ↪→ E is
the least non-trivial subtopos of E induced by the double negation topology on E .
We write D¯ for the object of Asm(P,D) with underlying set D and ||t||D¯ = {t} for
t ∈ D. Obviously, the counit ηD¯ : D¯ → ∆EΠED¯ is monic. If j : F ↪→ E is a nontrivial
subtopos of E then the counit D¯ → j∗j∗D¯ of j∗ a j∗ at D¯ factors along ηD via a subobject
j∗j∗D¯ ∆EΠED¯ whose characteristic predicate χD is given by χD(t) = jF ({t}) for t ∈ D
where jF is the closure operator on E inducing the subtopos F of E . Thus j∗j∗D¯ is
(isomorphic to) the assembly with underlying set D and ||t||j∗j∗D¯ = jF ({t}).
Now adapting an argument from [Joh13] we show that
Lemma 5.3. Every nontrivial Grothendieck subtopos F of E is equivalent to Set.
Proof. Suppose F is a nontrivial Grothendieck subtopos of E . We write j : F ↪→ E for the
corresponding inclusion. Since F is a Grothendieck topos it has arbitrary copowers. We
write ∆F(I) for the I-fold copower of 1F , i.e.
∐
I 1F . Notice that C = ∆F(D) and j∗j
∗D¯
are both assemblies. Since Asm(P,D) is an exponential ideal in RT(D,P ) the exponential
(j∗j∗D¯)C is an assembly, too, and, moreover, (isomorphic to) the D-fold product of j∗j∗D¯.
The underlying set of (j∗j∗D¯)C may be identified with the set of all functions from D to D
since ΠE((j∗j∗D¯)C) ∼= E(U, j∗j∗D¯)C) ∼= E(C, (j∗j∗D¯)U ) ∼= E(U, j∗j∗D¯)D ∼= Set(D,D).
Let jF be the closure operator on E giving rise to the subtopos F of E . The subobject
j∗j∗D¯ ∆EΠED¯ is classified by the predicate χD(t) = jF ({t}). Obviously, the Grothendieck
topos F is equivalent to Set iff χD is constantly true, i.e. there is a t ∈ P with t ∈
⋂
t∈D
jF ({t}).
For sake of contradiction suppose this were not the case. Then by axiom of choice on the
meta-level there exists a (typically non-continuous) function g : D → D with t 6∈ jF ({g(t)}).
For t ∈ D let st ∈ P be some realizer for the projection pit : (j∗j∗D¯)C → j∗j∗D¯ : h 7→ h(t).
Let f : D → D : t 7→ g(stt) for which it obviously holds that stt 6∈ jU ({f(t)}) for t ∈ D.
Since ΠE((j∗j∗D¯)C) ∼= Set(D,D) there is a t ∈ D realizing f as an object of (j∗j∗D¯)C . But
then stt ∈ jU ({f(t)}) which is impossible.
Now for showing Theorem 5.2 it remains to prove that
Lemma 5.4. The topos K is not equivalent to Set.
Proof. For sake of contradiction suppose that K is equivalent to Set. Then i∗i∗D¯ ∆EΠED¯
is an isomorphism. But then the predicate χD on ∆EΠED¯ is constantly true, i.e. there is
an s ∈ P with s ∈ jU ({t}) for all t ∈ D. But this is impossible since already jU ({>D}) =
(U → U) → U does not contain an element of P (since such an element t would map
i ∈ (U → U) ∩ P to an element ti ∈ U ∩ P = ∅).
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6. K is a model of full first order arithmetic
Since K hosts a natural numbers object NK it is most natural to ask how much of first order
arithmetic holds in K. First notice that all functions on N do exist as morphisms in K. An
arbitrary set-theoretic function f : N→ N is represented as the morphism fK : NK → NK
as given by the PK-predicate [[f(n) ∼NK m]] on N × N because there exists tf ∈ P with
tf n¯ = f(n) for all n ∈ N. Equality of natural numbers will be interpreted as [[· ∼NK ·]].
Propositional logical connectives will be interpreted as usual (see [Kri09]) but notice that
|A→B| = {t ∈ D | ∀s ∈ |A|. ts ∈ |B|}.8 Universal quantification over NK is interpreted as
|∀x.A(x)| =
⋂
n∈N
[[n ∼NK n]]→ |A(n)|
which is coincidence with [Kri09] since the equivalence of [[n ∼NK n]] and⋂
X∈ΣNK
X(0)→ ∀x(X(x)→ X(x+1))→ X(n)
can be realized by an element of P . As usual existential quantification over NK is interpreted
as its second order encoding, i.e.
|∃x.A(x)| =
⋂
X∈ΣK
(⋂
n∈N
(
[[n ∼NK n]]→ |A(n)| → X
))→ X
from which it follows that λf.fn¯t ∈ |∃x.A(x)| whenever t ∈ |A(n)|. Now we are ready to
prove that
Theorem 6.1. K validates all true sentences of first order arithmetic.
Proof. Since K is boolean and classically every first order sentence is provably equivalent
to a sentence in prenex form, i.e. a prefix of quantifiers followed by an equation between
arithmetic terms, it suffices to show that all true arithmetic formulas in prenex form do
hold in K. We proceed by structural induction on the structure of arithmetical sentences in
prenex form.
If e1 = e2 is a true arithmetical equation where both sides have value n ∈ N then e1 = e2
is realized by n¯ ∈ P .
Suppose ∀x.A(x) is a true arithmetical sentence in prenex form. Then for all n ∈ N the
sentence A(n) is true and in prenex form. Thus, by induction hypothesis for every n ∈ N
there is a pn ∈ P realizing A(n). Then there exists a t ∈ P with t>D = >D and tn¯ = pn for
all n ∈ N. Obviously t realizes ∀x.A(x).
Suppose ∃x.A(x) is a true arithmetical sentence in prenex form. Then for some n ∈ N
the sentence A(n) is true and in prenex form. By induction hypothesis there is a p ∈ P
realizing A(n) from which it follows that λf.fn¯p ∈ P realizes ∃x.A(x).
Thus, w.r.t. first order arithmetic sentences one cannot distinguish K from Set. But
already at second order things get much more delicate since one does not even know whether
every morphism NK → NK in K is induced by a map N → N in Set, i.e. whether for
any functional relation F from NK to NK there exists function f : N → N such that
∀x, y:NK.F (x, y)↔ f(x) ∼nK y holds in K. One easily sees that f is uniquely determined
by F but the question rather is whether for all F such an f exists.
8As in [Kri09] we write |A| for the interpretation of formula A.
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Actually, there is an even simpler question of this kind for which we do not know the
answer so far, namely whether in K the natural numbers object NK has only “standard”
global elements. More explictly, this means whether for any morphism a : 1K → NK in
K there is an n ∈ N such that a ∼NK n holds in K. The answer is definitely negative for
boolean valued models Sh(B) when B is a complete boolean algebra with more than 2
elements. Since if u ∈ B is different from 0B and 1B then so is ¬u and one may cook up a
“mixed” natural number a which is 0 on u and 1 on ¬u. We could come up with a similar
“nonstandard” global element of NK if ΩK = 2K were not 2-valued, i.e. if their existed an
u : 1→ 2K for which K validates neither u ∼2K 0 nor u ∼2K 1 though it certainly validates
the disjunction u ∼2K 0 ∨ u ∼2K 1.
7. The object ∆K(2) is infinite
In [Kri12] J.-L. Krivine has shown that ∆K(2) does not contain any atoms (w.r.t. the order
∆K(≤2)), i.e.
∀x:∆K(2)
(
x 6= 0→ ∃y:∆K(2)xy 6= 0 ∧ xy 6= x
)
which by classical logic is equivalent to
∀x:∆K(2)
(∀y:∆K(2)(xy 6= 0→ xy 6= x→ ⊥)→ x 6= 0→ ⊥)
For sake of completeness we recall Krivine’s argument for which purpose we have to
introduce a bit of machinery. For I ⊆fin N let I¯ ∈ D with I¯(~s) = > iff si = >D for all i ∈ I.
Notice that ∅¯ = >D and {n} = n¯. Obviously, we have
(1) >D v u iff u ∈ |>,⊥ → ⊥| ∩ |⊥,> → >|
(2) u  ⊥,⊥ → ⊥ iff u ∈ ↑{I | ∅ 6= I ⊆ {0, 1}}.
Let t ∈ D with t>D = >D and tI = 0¯ for nonempty subsets I of {0, 1}. Then t realizes both
|>,⊥ → ⊥| ∩ |⊥,> → >|,> → ⊥ and (⊥,⊥ → ⊥),⊥ → ⊥
and thus t realizes ∀x:∆K(2)
(∀y:∆K(2)(xy 6= 0 → xy 6= x → ⊥) → x 6= 0 → ⊥) as can be
seen by case analysis on x ∈ {0, 1}.
Thus, in K it holds that ∆K(2) is infinite. But it is not clear a priori whether ∆K(2) is
also Dedekind infinite, i.e. whether the assertion
∃f :∆K(2)NK(∀n,m:NK.f(n) ∼2K f(m)→ n ∼NK m)
holds in K.9 Actually, for quite some time we hoped that in K the object ∆K(2) would not
be Dedekind infinite since this would have had the consequence that K does not validate
countable choice.10 The reason for this hope was that presumably there does not exist a
monomorphism NK ∆K(2) in K.
However, we will show that K does indeed validate countable and even dependent choice.
From this it follows that K validates the assertion that there exists an injective function
from NK to ∆K(2) though presumably this existential statement is not witnessed by a global
element of ∆K(2)NK , i.e. a proper monomorphism NK ∆K(2) in K.
9See e.g. [Je73] for the construction of a model of ZF in which there exists a Dedekind finite set which
is not finite. This cannot be achieved by forcing since forcing models all validate AC. One has to consider
an appropriate group G of automorphism on an appropriate complete boolean algebra B and take the
G-invariant part of the B-valued model.
10As remarked in [Je73] for any infinite set using countable choice one can prove quite straightforwardly
the existence of an injective function from N into this set.
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8. K validates countable and dependent choice
Though Krivine’s classical realizability gives rise to models of the classical set theory ZF
(as described in [Kri01]) it generally does not validate the full axiom of choice. Moreover,
it is not known whether all classical realizability models for ZF validate the principles of
dependent or at least countable choice. Though, unfortunately, so far we do not know any
counterexample J.-L. Krivine strongly suspects that the answer to this question will be
negative. In his opinion for realizing countable and dependent choice one has to extend
his λ-calculus with control with new language constructs as described in [Kri03] where he
adds a variant of LISP and Scheme’s quote construct and shows how this may be used for
realizing the above mentioned choice principles. But this method works only if the set Λ of
“terms” is countable which is, obviously, not the case for the realizability structure arising
from D = ΣD
ω
in Coh since D has the size of the continuum.
However, as known from work of C. Spector dating back to the early 60s one may use bar
recursion for realizing classical choice principles. This approach has been applied fruitfully in
“traditional” proof theory as described and discussed in U. Kohlenbach’s monograph [Koh08].
However, Spector’s original work and most of [Koh08] are based on Go¨del’s Dialectica
interpretation and not on realizability. Thus, for our purposes the approach of U. Berger and
P. Oliva in [BO05] (also discussed in [Koh08]) is a better starting point since it is based on
modified realizability which can be adapted more easily to the case of classical realizability.11
In [BO05] it is shown that when starting from a model M of higher type arithmetic
validating an appropriate form of bar recursion certain negative translations (where ⊥ is
replaced by arbitrary Σ01-formulas) of classical choice principles admit a modified realizability
interpretation by objects of M. For this purpose in [BO05] they consider a ‘modified
bar recursor’ whose analogue in our setting we will introduce next after some preliminary
remarks.
First of all for a coherence space X we have to consider X∗ =
∐
n∈N
Xn, the set of lists of
elements of X, which per se is not a coherence space since it lacks a least element. However,
we say that a map f from X∗ to a coherence space Y is stable iff for all n ∈ N the restriction
of f to Xn is stable. Moreover, if Y is a coherence space then X∗→Y ∼= ∏n∈ωXn→Y is a
coherence space since the Xn→Y are coherence spaces. Alternatively, we may work in the
slightly larger category ωdIc of coherently complete countably based dI-domains (see [AC98])
and stable continuous functions between them. We will have to consider stable functionals
in the finite type hierarchy in Coh generated from Σ and D by →, (−)ω and (−1)∗ → (−2).
For every such type X we have to specify its subset PLX of proof-like elements. Of course,
for D we put PLD = P and for Σ we put PLΣ = {⊥}. If X and Y are such types we put
PLX→Y = {f : X → Y | ∀x ∈ PLX .f(x) ∈ PLY }, PLXω = PLωX and PLX∗ = PL∗X , i.e. we
extend PL a` la logical relations.
Definition 8.1. Given Y : Dω → Σ and G : ((D → Σ)→ Σ)ω in Coh let BR(Y,G) be the
least stable function Ψ : D∗ → Σ in Coh satisfying
Ψ(s) = Y (s ∗ λn.G|s|(λx.Ψ(s ∗ x)))
for all s ∈ D∗.
Obviously, the ensuing map BR : (Dω → Σ) → ((D → Σ) → Σ)ω → Σ is stable and
proof-like.
11This does not mean that methods based on Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation are not more appropriate
for the purposes of extracting programs and bounds from (classical) proofs as emphasized in [Koh08].
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Notice that all the types built from D and Σ by →, (−)ω and (−1)∗ → (−2) appear as
retracts of D via proof-like maps. They form a typed pca realizability over which gives rise
to a category equivalent to RT(D,P ) as described on a more general level in [LS02]. This
allows us to assume that realizers of particular propositions have particular types which
often allows us to reason in a more intuitive way.
We often will have to refer to ΩK considered as an object of E . This object has underlying
set {A ∈ P(D) | A‚‚ = A} for which equality is given by logical equivalence12. Moreover,
for objects X in K the exponential PK(X) = ΩXK is the same when taken in E and K,
respectively. Moreover, for X in E the map ΩηXK : Ωi∗i
∗X
K → ΩXK (where ηX : X → i∗i∗X is
the unit of i∗ a i∗ at X) is an isomorphism in E . Accordingly, we will often write PK(X) for
ΩXK in E .
8.1. Countable Choice holds in K. Spector already observed that the negative translation
of countable choice can be proved in any intuitionistic theory validating countable choice and
the principle of Double Negation Shift (DNS) for formulas in the negative fragment. Like all
relative realizability toposes E = RT(D,P ) validates countable and dependent choice. Thus,
due to Spector’s observation it suffices to show that E also validates an appropriate form of
DNS.
Lemma 8.2. The topos E validates the principle
(DNS) ∀B:PK(N).∀n.∼∼B(n)→ ∼∼∀n.B(n)
where ∼A stands for A→ U .
Proof. Suppose B ∈ P(D)ω with B(n)‚‚ = B(n) for all n, G of type ((D → Σ) → Σ)ω
realize ∀n.∼∼B(n) and Y of type Dω → Σ realize ∼∀n.B(n). Let Ψ = BR(Y,G). Using a
variant of bar induction as described in [BO05] we will show now that Ψ(〈〉) = > and thus
realizes U .
We write S(x, n) for x ∈ B(n) and P (s) for Ψ(s) = >. We employ the abbreviations
s ∈ S ≡ ∀k < |s| sk ∈ B(k) and α ∈ S ≡ ∀k αk ∈ B(k). By bar induction relativized to S
(see [BO05] for details) for showing P (〈〉) it suffices to show that
(1) ∀α ∈ S∃n P (α¯(n))
(2) ∀s ∈ S(∀x(S(x, |s|)→ P (s ∗ x)))→ P (s).
ad (1) : Suppose α ∈ S, i.e. α(n) ∈ B(n) for all n. Then by assumption on Y we have
Y (α) = >. Since Y is continuous there exists an n with Y (α) = Y (α¯(n) ∗ β) for all β. Thus,
we have Ψ(α¯(n)) = >, i.e. P (α¯(n)) as desired.
ad (2) : Suppose s ∈ S with ∀x(S(x, |s|) → P (s∗x)), i.e. ∀x(x ∈ B(|s|) → Ψ(s∗x) =
>). Thus λx.Ψ(s ∗ x) realizes ∼B(|s|). Accordingly, by assumption on G it follows that
G|s|(λx.ψ(s ∗ x)) realizes U and thus also B(n) (since B(n) contains U as a subset like
all propositions in K). Thus s ∗ λn.G|s|(λx.ψ(s ∗ x)) realizes ∀n.B(n) and, accordingly, by
assumption on Y it follows that Ψ(s) = Y (s ∗ λn.G|s|(λx.ψ(s ∗ x))) realizes U , i.e. P (s) as
desired.
Thus, since λG.λY.BR(Y,G)(〈〉) is proof-like it realizes the proposition
∀B:PK(N).∀n.∼∼B(n)→ ∼∼∀n.B(n)
which, therefore, holds in E as claimed.
12which is the same in E and K for propositions of this particular form
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Notice that the form of bar induction used in the proof of Th. 8.2 is valid only because
Dω consists of all sequences in D (and not just the computable ones).
Now we are ready to show that countable choice holds in K.
Theorem 8.3. For every object X in K the proposition
∀R:P(N×X). ∀n:N.∃x:X.R(n, x)→ ∃f :XN .∀n:N.R(n, f(n))
hold in K.
Proof. Since K is equivalent to the subtopos EU of E consisting of sheaves for jU = ∼ ◦ ∼
the problem reduces to showing that
∀R:PK(N×X). ∀n:N.∼∼∃x:X.R(n, x)→ ∼∼∃f :XN .∀n:N.R(n, f(n))
holds in E . By Lemma 8.2 the implication
∀n:N.∼∼∃x:X.R(n, x)→ ∼∼∀n:N.∃x:X.R(n, x)
holds in E and thus it suffices to show that
∀R:PK(N×X).∼∼∀n:N.∃x:X.R(n, x)→ ∼∼∃f :XN .∀n:N.R(n, f(n))
holds in E . This, however, holds since E validates countable choice and ∼∼ commutes with
implication.
Thus, we have shown that K validates countable choice since XN is isomorphic to XNK
in E .
Notice that for classical realizability models arising from countable term models one
cannot apply the method we have used here because bar induction does not seem to be
applicable since not every external sequence of terms can be represented by a term. Thus, for
countable term models Krivine in [Kri03] introduced a quote-like construct for the purpose
of realizing countable choice. Apparently, these two different methods are applicable under
mutually exclusive circumstances. Whether countable choice holds in all realizability models
is unknown up to now but one strongly suspects that the answer is negative!
8.2. Dependent Choice in K. A topos with natural numbers object N validates the
principle DC of Dependent Choice iff
∀R:P(N×X×X).∀n:N.∀x:X.∃y:X.R(n, x, y)→
∀a:X.∃f :XN . f(0) = a ∧ ∀n:N.R(n, f(n), f(n+1))
holds for every object X of the topos. It is well know that E and actually every relative
realizability topos validates DC. Unfortunately, the validity of Double Negation Shift in
E is not sufficient for reducing validity of DC in K to its validity in E . For this reason in
Theorem 4 of [BO05] it is shown how to use modified bar recursion for realizing appropriate
negative translations of DC. With some effort their proof can be adapted to K. We leave the
tedious details to the inclined reader. Notice, however, that Theorem 8.3 suffices already for
showing that the infinite object ∆K(2) is also Dedekind infinite, i.e. that K validates the
proposition ∃f :∆K(2)N (∀n,m:N.f(n) ∼2K f(m). However, this valid existential statement
need not be witnessed by a global element of ∆K(2)N .
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9. Is K 2-valued?
A proposition A ∈ ΩK is valid in K iff A ∩ P 6= ∅. The topos K is 2-valued iff for every
A ∈ ΩK either A or ¬A has nonempty intersection with P .
Notice that for t ∈ D we have t ∈ P iff tr(t) ∩ Pω = ∅. Thus, if A holds in K then
A‚ ∩Pω = ∅. If the reverse implication held as well then K would be 2-valued which can be
seen as follows. Suppose A does not hold in K. Then, due to our assumption, there exists
~s ∈ A‚ ∩ Pω and thus λt.~s ∈ Dω. t(~s) is an element of P ∩ ¬A.
But if A is the biorthogonal closure of a countable subset of D we actually can reverse
the implication.
Lemma 9.1. If A = {tn | n ∈ ω}‚‚ with A‚ ∩ Pω = ∅ then A ∩ P 6= ∅.
Proof. W.l.o.g.13 we assume that t−1n+1(>) ⊆ t−1n (>) for all n ∈ ω. We consider the countably
branching tree T =
⋃
n∈ω
{n} × tr(tn) where the ancestor of 〈n+1, ~s〉 is the unique element
〈n,~r〉 with ~r v ~s. Observe that for every ~s ∈ A‚ and n ∈ ω there is a unique ~s(n) ∈ tr(tn)
with ~s(n) v ~s. Thus, the minimal elements of A‚ are precisely the suprema of the infinite
paths in T , i.e. for every ~s ∈ min(A‚) we have ~s = ⊔
n∈ω
~s(n). Thus, due to our assumption
A‚ ∩Pω = ∅ every infinite path through T eventually leads out of Pω. Let t be the element
of D whose trace consists of those finite elements ~s of Dω with ~s(n) 6∈ Pω but ~s(k) ∈ Pω for
all k < n. Obviously, we have t ∈ P and min(A‚) ⊆ t−1(>). Thus t ∈ A ∩ P as desired.
In order to generalize this lemma to arbitrary propositions in K one could try to work
with a well ordering of a biorthogonally closed subset A of D but then beyond stage ω the
labels of the tree T are not finite anymore.
Another line of attack would be as follows. Suppose A = A‚‚ such that tr(t) ∩ Pω 6= ∅
for all t ∈ A. Notice that the (upward closures) of the sets tr(t)∩Pω with t ∈ A form a filter
w.r.t. the Smyth ordering. But, alas, we do not know how to prove that the intersection of
the elements of this filter has to be non-empty.
On the other hand we do not know any particular biorthogonally closed subset of D
which does not already arise as the biorthogonal of a countable subset. In particular, we
may replace any proposition A with the biorthogonal closure of the intersection of A with
the computable elements of A. Maybe this does not make any difference for propositions A
arising from the interpretation of a closed formula in the language of set theory.
10. Summary
We have shown that a new boolean non-Grothendieck topos K arises from a canonical model
of λ-calculus with control in the category Coh of coherence spaces and stable functions. We
have shown that K validates all true sentences of first order arithmetic and also countable
(and dependent) choice.
We have also observed that the model constructions collapses to the ground model Set
when starting from the canonical model of λ-calulus with control in Scott domains where as
usual the culprit is parallel-or.
There are still quite a few open questions about the topos K arising from the stable
model of λ-calulus with control. One would like to see a concrete example of a set-theoretic
13This can be achieved easily since u : Σ× Σ→ Σ is stable.
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statement holding in Set but not in K. We suspect that AC, the full axiom of choice, is
such an example but have not been able yet to verify this. Moreover, one would like to know
whether every closed formula in the language of set theory is decided by K.
All our arguments apply also to the case when D ∼= ΣDω is solved in the category of
observably sequential algorithms because it does not host parallel-or and all (even non-
effective) elements of Dω are represented by elements of D.
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